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THE NIPPON QUAGMIRE: ARTICLE III 
COURTS AND FINALITY OF UNITED 
STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE DECISIONS 
Jane Restani* & Ira Bloom† 
he jurisdiction of the United States Court of International 
Trade (“CIT”), an Article III court with national jurisdic-
tion,1 extends to various challenges to governmental decisions 
involving imports.2 In recent decades, most of the CIT’s work 
has involved review of decisions of the International Trade 
Commission (“ITC”) and the United States Department of 
Commerce (“Commerce”) in unfair trade cases.3 Judicial review 
of such decisions is provided under 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a), and ju-
risdiction over such review is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). Var-
ious decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“CAFC”), to which decisions of the CIT may be appealed,4 have 
raised the issue of whether the CIT is authorized to give com-
plete relief through reversal of agency unfair trade decisions. 
This Article resolves that issue by concluding that the relief 
available in unfair trade cases is essentially the same as that 
permitted under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) for 
reviews on the agency record,5 and that agency decisions may 
be reversed if contrary to law and when the record will support 
only one result. Furthermore, as an Article III court, the CIT is 
empowered by the U.S. Constitution to issue final decisions 
subject only to appeal to higher courts. This Article discusses 
both statutory and constitutional law underlying these conclu-
sions, as well as various decisions that have otherwise impeded 
efficient and effective final court relief. 
The problem is easiest to understand in the context of ITC in-
jury determinations, which gave rise to the CAFC decisions of 
                                                                                                             
* Judge, United States Court of International Trade. 
† Professor of Political Science, Lehman College of The City University of 
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 1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 251, 1581 (2012). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012). 
 3. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2012) (regarding countervailing of sub-
sidies); 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2012) (regarding antidumping duties). 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2012). 
 5. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 
T
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most concern here. Injury, except in very unusual circumstanc-
es, is a prerequisite to duties to offset the effects of unfair trade 
practices, namely, dumping or subsidization.6 Only if injury to 
                                                                                                             
 6. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (2012) provides: 
General Rule 
If– 
   (1) the administering authority determines that the government 
of a country or any public entity within the territory of a country is 
providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy with re-
spect to the manufacture, production, or export of a class or kind of 
merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, 
into the United States, and 
   (2) in the case of merchandise imported from a Subsidies 
Agreement country, the Commission determines that– 
   (A) an industry in the United States–   
         (i) is materially injured, or  
        (ii) is threatened with material injury, or  
   (B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is ma-
terially retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise or by rea-
son of sales (or the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for impor-
tation, 
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing 
duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of 
the net countervailable subsidy . . . 
19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2012) provides: 
If–  
   (1) the administering authority determines that a class or kind 
of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United 
States at less than its fair value, and 
   (2) the Commission determines that– 
   (A) an industry in the United States–   
         (i) is materially injured, or  
         (ii) is threatened with material injury, or  
   (B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is ma-
terially retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise or by rea-
son of sales (or the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for impor-
tation, 
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping 
duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, in an amount equal to 
the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price (or 
the constructed export price) for the merchandise . . . 
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a domestic industry is found may dumping or governmental 
subsidization be remedied through additional duties—that is, 
duties in addition to ordinary tariffs. Injury determinations are 
“thumbs up” or “thumbs down.” Either there is injury—
including threat of injury—or not.7 By way of contrast, Com-
merce calculates through complex methodologies the rates of 
dumping or governmental subsidization, rates which are to be 
converted into duty assessments.8 In most cases where judicial 
relief is granted, rates change; they do not vanish. Thus, if the 
reviewing court finds the methodology applied by Commerce 
wanting, there are complex tasks for the agency to perform. 
Some CIT decisions have found the affirmative injury deter-
mination in error to the degree that the determination cannot 
be supported by any reasonable reading of the record. These 
decisions have been difficult for the CAFC to accept. Why that 
is so is not a question this Article attempts to answer. In the 
course of rejecting such results, however, the CAFC has raised 
the issue, which this Article addresses. 
The issue is set forth most clearly in Nippon Steel Corp. v. 
United States,9 (“Nippon VI”), which cites the other cases of 
immediate concern. The relevant passage is set forth in its en-
tirety: 
The United States also argues that the Court of International 
Trade acted ultra vires in directing the Commission to enter a 
negative material injury determination, and asserts that [19 
U.S.C.] § 1516a does not permit the court to reverse a deter-
mination of the Commission, directly or indirectly. We have 
stated in dicta that “[s]ection 1516a limits the Court of Inter-
national Trade to affirmances and remand orders; an outright 
reversal without a remand does not appear to be contemplat-
ed by the statute.” Altx[, Inc. v United States, 370 F.3d 1108,] 
1111 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, we implied the opposite in 
Atlantic Sugar[, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 
1561(Fed. Cir. 1994)], also in dicta, where we said that if the 
evidence supporting a material injury determination is “in-
                                                                                                             
 7. For purposes of this Article we need not distinguish between determi-
nations of injury or threat of injury. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A)–(C) 
(2012) (concerning material injury) with § 1677(7)(F) (2012) (concerning 
threat of material injury). 
 8. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671e(a), 1673e(a) (2012). 
 9. Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
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substantial, then the reviewing court must either reverse the 
[Commission]’s determination or remand the case for further 
fact-finding.” Because, here, substantial evidence supports 
the Commission’s original affirmative material injury deter-
mination, we need not and do not decide the scope of Court of 
International Trade authority to reverse under § 1516a. It 
may well be that, in another situation, the trade court may be 
faced with a Commission determination that is unsupported 
by substantial evidence, and for which a remand would be 
“futile.” Nippon IV, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 1222. We hold only 
that this is not the case today. 
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(3), innocently enough, provides: 
(3) Remand for final disposition 
If the final disposition of an action brought under this section 
is not in harmony with the published determination of the 
Secretary, the administering authority, or the Commission, 
the matter shall be remanded to the Secretary, the adminis-
tering authority, or the Commission, as appropriate, for dis-
position consistent with the final disposition of the court. 
Although this particular paragraph of § 1516a is not cited by 
the CAFC in Nippon VI, it is the only subsection of § 1516a 
that comes close to the idea expressed that perhaps the CIT 
can only affirm or remand, but never reverse. Obviously, a 
straight affirmance requires no action by the agency, but we 
assert here that anything else—specifically, remand to recon-
sider, remand to apply a different methodology, or remand to 
publish a totally different result—requires remand, and the 
last is effectively a reversal. In other words, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a 
reflects the procedures required to effectuate dumping and 
countervailing duties. It is not a provision that prohibits sub-
stantive reversals, as the Nippon VI court may have implied. 
The way unfair trade duties are actually imposed is quite 
complicated. When ITC and Commerce make preliminary un-
fair trade determinations, the determination must be pub-
lished, liquidation10 of entries by the United States Customs 
                                                                                                             
 10. “[L]iquidation[] [is] long honored in customs procedure as the final 
reckoning of an importer’s liability on an entry. It is defined as ‘the final 
computation or ascertainment of the duties or drawback accruing on an en-
try.’” Farrell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. 7, 12, 667 F.2d 1017, 
1020 (1982) (Markey, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (2014)); ac-
cord Travenol Labs., Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d 749, 753 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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and Border Protection (“Customs”) must be suspended, and 
cash deposit rates must be calculated and imposed on new en-
tries of merchandise.11 When a final ITC decision is issued, if 
Commerce has reached a final determination of dumping or 
                                                                                                             
 11. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(d) (2012) provides: 
If the preliminary determination of the administering authority un-
der subsection (b) of this section is affirmative, the administering 
authority– 
  (1)(A) shall– 
   (i) determine an estimated individual countervailable subsidy 
rate for each exporter and producer individually investigated, and, in 
accordance with section 1671d(c)(5) of this title, an estimated all-
others rate for all exporters and producers not individually investi-
gated and for new exporters and producers within the meaning of 
section 1675(a)(2)(B) of this title, or 
   (ii) if section 1677f-1(e)(2)(B) of this title applies, determine a 
single estimated country-wide subsidy rate, applicable to all export-
ers and producers, and 
    (B) shall order the posting of a cash deposit, bond, or other securi-
ty, as the administering authority deems appropriate, for each entry 
of the subject merchandise in an amount based on the estimated in-
dividual countervailable subsidy rate, the estimated all-others rate, 
or the estimated country-wide subsidy rate, whichever is applicable, 
(2) shall order the suspension of liquidation of all entries of mer-
chandise subject to the determination which are entered, or with-
drawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the later of– 
    (A) the date on which notice of the determination is published in 
the Federal Register, or 
    (B) the date that is 60 days after the date on which notice of the 
determination to initiate the investigation is published in the Feder-
al Register, and 
(3) shall make available to the Commission all information upon 
which its determination was based and which the Commission con-
siders relevant to its injury determination, under such procedures as 
the administering authority and the Commission may establish to 
prevent disclosure, other than with the consent of the party provid-
ing it or under protective order, of any information to which confi-
dential treatment has been given by the administering authority. 
The instructions of the administering authority under paragraphs 
(1) and (2) may not remain in effect for more than 4 months. 
The provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d), applicable to antidumping duties, 
provide very similar procedures. 
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subsidization, Commerce publishes an antidumping or coun-
tervailing duty order and instructs Customs to assess the cor-
responding duties.12 
Diamond Sawblades Manufacturers Coalition v. United 
States13 illustrates very well the administrative necessity of a 
remand to effectuate the court’s decision. In that case, the 
CAFC upheld the CIT decision sustaining a determination af-
ter remand by the CIT to the ITC.14 On remand the ITC 
switched from a negative to an affirmative injury determina-
tion.15 That switch required the issuance of the actual anti-
dumping duty order by Commerce.16 The court noted the duty 
of the ITC to advise Commerce of a final material injury de-
termination under 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(d),17 and that upon such 
                                                                                                             
 12. 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a) (2012) provides: 
(a) Publication of countervailing duty order 
Within 7 days after being notified by the Commission of an affirma-
tive determination under section 1671d(b) of this title, the adminis-
tering authority shall publish a countervailing duty order which– 
 (1) directs customs officers to assess a countervail-
ing duty equal to the amount of the net countervailable sub-
sidy determined or estimated to exist, within 6 months after 
the date on which the administering authority receives sat-
isfactory information upon which the assessment may be 
based, but in no event later than 12 months after the end of 
the annual accounting period of the manufacturer or ex-
porter within which the merchandise is entered, or with-
drawn from warehouse, for consumption, 
 (2) includes a description of the subject merchan-
dise, in such detail as the administering authority deems 
necessary, and 
 (3) requires the deposit of estimated countervailing 
duties pending liquidation of entries of merchandise at the 
same time as estimated normal customs duties on that mer-
chandise are deposited. 
19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a), applicable to antidumping duties, is similar. 
 13. Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coal. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1374 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010). 
 14. Id. at 1377, 1383. 
 15. Id. at 1377. 
 16. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) (2012). 
 17. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(d) (2012) provides: 
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advisement Commerce is required to issue the antidumping 
duty order under 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) and to collect duty de-
posits under 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(3). As the appellate court 
stated: 
Sections 1673d(d) and 1673e(a) apply when the Commission 
issues a material injury determination, regardless of whether 
that determination is made in the first instance or on remand, 
and regardless of whether there is any subsequent judicial re-
view of that determination.18 
The court held that the ITC was required to notify Commerce 
as soon as its decision on remand was issued, and Commerce 
was required to fulfill its statutory duties immediately.19 
Finally, the court held that the CIT did not abuse its discre-
tion in ordering Commerce to issue the order and to instruct 
Customs to collect duty deposits.20 The important point for this 
Article is that it is the agency’s action on remand that triggers 
the essential parts of the statutory scheme for the imposition of 
unfair trade remedies. That is why 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(3) re-
fers to matters “remanded.”21 There is no statutory bar to sub-
stantive reversal, expressed or implied. It is simply that rever-
sal is accomplished through actions the agency takes pursuant 
to the court remand. Perhaps this is all that Nippon VI meant 
in suggesting remand might always be necessary in response to 
error. This interpretation of the statute is fully in accord with 
and is informed by 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1), which directs the 
reviewing court, the CIT, to “hold unlawful any determination, 
finding, or conclusion found . . . not in accordance with law,” or, 
depending on the type of action, any determination that is arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by 
substantial evidence.22 
                                                                                                             
Whenever the administering authority or the Commission makes a 
determination under this section, it shall notify the petitioner, other 
parties to the investigation, and the other agency of its determina-
tion and of the facts and conclusions of law upon which the determi-
nation is based, and it shall publish notice of its determination in the 
Federal Register. 
 18. Diamond Sawblades, 626 F.3d at 1381 (footnote omitted). 
 19. Id. at 1378. 
 20. Id. at 1382–83. 
 21. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(3) (2012). 
 22. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
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The standards of review for decisions under 19 U.S.C. § 
1516a(b) and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (APA)23 are essentially the 
same. Both require unlawful, arbitrary, and unsupported deci-
sions to be set aside. This is what federal courts do when they 
exercise the judicial power of the United States in reviewing 
agency decisions. Anything else would make the statutes hol-
low promises of judicial review.24 
Returning to the more common course of events which do not 
involve reversals, if there is no court affirmance, there will be 
remands for various purposes, such as to require reassessment 
under a different interpretation of the law than previously ap-
plied by the agency, to rethink methodologies, or to consider 
previously rejected or ignored evidence. Furthermore, rates of-
ten must be recalculated by Commerce for various exporters 
and producers, and changes to the “all others rate” for compa-
nies not individually examined may occur.25 These are all deci-
                                                                                                             
 23. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) refers to compelled agency action. The CIT does not 
enjoin action under Section 1516a and its corresponding jurisdictional provi-
sion, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). If such relief is necessary because actions under 28 
U.S.C. § 1581(c) provide manifestly inadequate relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) ju-
risdiction is available. Consol. Bearings Co. v. United States, 348 F.3d 997, 
1002 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ((i) jurisdiction if no other subsection confers jurisdic-
tion or remedy is manifestly inadequate). Thus, together the various trade 
statutes give the CIT all of the authority found in 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 24. Apparently there is considerable controversy as to whether the CAFC 
should repeat this type of review. See NSK Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 
542 F. App’x 950, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential). In voting to deny 
rehearing en banc, five judges observed that “The pertinent review provisions 
of the trade statutes track the APA. At the time it enacted those statutes, 
Congress expressed a desire that agency review by the Court of International 
Trade and this court would be modeled on APA review.” Id. at 953. 
While not disputing this particular point as to CIT review, three judges voted 
for rehearing en banc to consider whether review in the CAFC of the CIT’s 
APA type review should be more limited, giving enhanced deference to CIT 
decisions. See id. at 955-62 (Wallach, J., dissenting). 
 25. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d) states: 
If the preliminary determination of the administering authority un-
der subsection (b) of this section is affirmative, the administering 
authority–  
  (1)(A) shall– 
(i) determine an estimated weighted average dumping mar-
gin for each exporter and producer individually investigat-
ed, and 
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sions that may be challenged anew. These matters are the re-
sults of substantive remands to reconsider or explain, not re-
mands to effectuate a reversal. It is the latter type of remand 
that confronted the court in Nippon VI. 
The finality problem discussed here likely is caused in part 
by the Court of Appeals’ rejection of attempts by the United 
States to appeal remand orders that seem effectively to dispose 
of the case. While the CAFC has never really resolved whether 
reversals of ITC injury determinations are appealable, as indi-
cated in Nippon VI, or even whether remands ordering reversal 
of ITC determinations are appealable, it has specifically reject-
ed appeals of remand orders to Commerce.26 In both Badger-
Powhatan v. United States and Cabot Corp. v. United States, 
the appellate court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdic-
tion because the CIT’s remand orders were not “final judg-
ments,” nor were they appealable collateral orders or appeala-
ble under any other exception to the final judgment rule.27 Be-
cause these two cases seem to involve remand orders most like 
final judgments, it is fair to assume that there are no other 
types of remand orders issued by the CIT to Commerce pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) jurisdiction that will pass appellate 
jurisdictional muster under CAFC precedent. 
We cannot fault the appellate court for not accepting these 
particular remands as collateral orders of the type found ap-
pealable in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.28 After 
all, these remand orders resolved the central issue in the case. 
But the principle set forth in Gillespie v. United States Steel 
                                                                                                             
  
(ii) determine, in accordance with section 1673d(c)(5) of this 
title, an estimated all-others rate for all exporters and pro-
ducers not individually investigated, . . . . 
 26. See, e.g., Badger-Powhatan v. United States, 808 F.2d 823 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (involving authority to amend antidumping duty order to conform to 
revised ITC injury determination); Cabot Corp. v. United States, 788 F.2d 
1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (involving what constitutes a bounty or grant for coun-
tervailing duty law). 
 27. Badger-Powhatan, 808 F.2d at 825-26; Cabot Corp., 788 F.2d at 1543. 
 28. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545–47, 552 
(1949) (dealing with a state law claim for security for expenses of a potential-
ly successful defendant in a stockholder derivative action. The Court was 
concerned that without a right to appeal the collateral order regarding secu-
rity, the right conferred by the state statute at issue would be lost by the time 
the main action was resolved). 
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Corp.,29 that finality is not a fixed concept and an appellate 
court should determine if the order appealed from essentially 
decides the case, does not seem to function in the area of con-
cern here.30 Principles of fundamental fairness and preserva-
tion of rights in a more than technical sense deserve some con-
sideration. It is true that in many, if not most, cases there is 
room for something to occur on remand that will require fur-
ther resolution by the CIT so that immediate appeal is not ap-
propriate; this, however, is not true of every remand to Com-
merce, just as it is not true of every remand to the ITC. The re-
sult is that even when great expense and effort could be avoid-
ed by resolving the case at the appellate level immediately, the 
agency is faced with complying with a “non-final” remand. The 
remand results in a new draft determination, comments there-
on, and then a “final” remand determination. The inability of 
the agency to obtain review of these “almost final” decisions 
may be one reason why the agencies often seem reluctant to 
comply fully with CIT remand orders, and why multiple re-
mands are required to get to a stage where the CIT can ap-
prove the remand results.31 Once the CIT approves the remand 
results, a judgment that is acceptably final for the CAFC appel-
late jurisdiction is entered. This lack of immediate appellate 
access is also somewhat hazardous for the agency, because 
when it finally does comply to the CIT’s satisfaction, it must 
                                                                                                             
 29. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 149–155 (1964), 
involved a wrongful death action in which the district court restricted plain-
tiff’s claim to its Jones Act cause of action. The Supreme Court permitted the 
challenge to the pretrial dismissal of state law and unseaworthiness claims to 
go forward because, inter alia, the question presented was “fundamental to 
the further conduct of the case.” Id. at 154. 
 30. An efficient road to the conclusion of an unfair trade case is particular-
ly important because in most cases no changes occur at the agency until there 
is a conclusive, not simply an appealable, final order. See Timken Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 893 F.2d 337, 339–40 (concluding that “final court decision” in 19 
U.S.C. § 1516a(e) means a “conclusive” decision in the action). Essentially, if 
the government agency loses, it obtains an automatic stay pending appeal of 
its duty to publish a new effective determination. 
 31. Besides the saga represented by Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States 
(Nippon VI), 458 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006), various other cases illustrate the 
problem of multiple remands. See, e.g., Hontex Enters. v. United States, 425 
F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1319 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006) (on fourth go-round, sufficient 
finality for appeal of Commerce determination achieved); Elkem Metals Co. v. 
United States, 2008 WL 4097463 (Ct. Int’l Trade Sept. 5, 2008) (on fifth go-
round, ITC determination achieved sufficient finality for appeal). 
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take care to make clear that it is only complying under compul-
sion. If it is seen to acquiesce, presumably the appellate court 
would find no controversy to resolve.32 
It is difficult to get out of this loop, but not impossible. First, 
in order to get the CIT to enter a remand order as a final judg-
ment, the government, upon a decision not in its favor, would 
have to seek the kind of remand order that directs a result—a 
result that resolves the case. As indicated, this has not helped 
Commerce bypass potentially futile remand proceedings in the 
past. The ITC also would not seek the entry of such an order 
because apparently it confuses procedural remand with sub-
stantive reversal via remand.33 If such a remand order or 
judgment effectively ending the case were then analyzed on 
practical grounds, such as those discussed in Gillespie, the 
CAFC might accept it as a final appealable judgment. 
Second, the agencies could accept the status quo with respect 
to the appealability of remand orders at the CAFC but comply 
quickly and reasonably, neither under-interpreting nor over-
interpreting the CIT remand order. This should end multiple 
remands. Finally, the agencies could request certification for 
interlocutory appeal more often.34 If the agencies used the pro-
cess wisely, the CIT likely would certify more issues, particu-
larly if the CAFC exhibited more interest in such certifica-
tions.35 This potentially would also lead to faster resolution of 
important issues.36 
                                                                                                             
 32. The CIT described this process in GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United 
States, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1348 n.2 (Ct. Int’l Trade Oct. 30, 2013). 
 33. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 
932 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing ITC’s argument that even if the CIT were 
correct in finding no evidence to support the agency’s finding, remand rather 
than reversal would be required). 
 34. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(1) permits a CIT judge to certify for interlocutory 
appeal an issue the resolution of which will “advance the ultimate termina-
tion of the litigation” and that involves a controlling question of law as to 
which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion. This parallels 
the procedure for certification for appeal by a district judge. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b) (2012). 
 35. See Alexandra Hess et al., Permissive Interlocutory Appeals at the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Fifteen Years in Review (1995-2010), 
60 AM. U.L. REV. 757, 779–83 (2011) (discussing limited instances of such 
appeals at the CAFC). 
 36. Of course, finality and increased efficiency could be accomplished by 
eliminating two tiered judicial review and having trade determinations re-
viewed by a panel of three judges of the CIT. See Herbert C. Shelley, The 
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It was not only this legal quagmire that may have caused the 
court in Nippon VI to raise the issue of effective reversals, but 
the Nippon VI court also may have understood the practical 
problem of interpreting the statute to forbid reversals that 
would be final enough for appellate review. It described the fu-
tility of not reversing when a record could support only one re-
sult, and when that acceptable result was not the one the agen-
cy reached.37 In a decision such as that of the ITC involving in-
jury, where multiple economic factors are weighed to reach a 
“yes” or “no” result, it may be difficult to say in a particular 
case that there is no substantial evidence for a certain result, 
and that the record will support only the opposite. This as-
sessment is difficult, but not impossible, at least theoretically. 
There is also the possibility that assessment of the record un-
der a legal framework newly declared by the reviewing court 
can lead to only one result. Directing the agency to undertake a 
new substantive assessment in such situations is inefficient 
and futile. Effectively, reversal is required in such a case, and 
if the case needs to be remanded to trigger various actions un-
der the statute, it is simply remanded for implementation of 
the reversal. 
We must point out one more problem of reaching finality that 
has plagued these cases. There sometimes appears to be a lack 
of understanding that the two key litigating interests are not 
parties representing the United States and the entity with 
goods on which duties are imposed. The key combatants in the 
referenced cases are foreign exporters or producers and domes-
tic industries.38 Commerce—or the ITC—lines up through its 
determination on one side or the other of a particular claim. In 
                                                                                                             
Standard of Review Applied by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in International Trade and Customs Cases, 45 AM. U.L. REV. 
1749, 1805 (1996); see also Thomas J. Aquilino, Jr., The Third Dominick L. 
DiCarlo U.S. Court of International Trade Lecture: To Amend the Course of 
Judicial Review of International Trade Cases in the United States (November 
4, 2004) (on file with the Library, U.S. Court of International Trade); Proceed-
ings of the Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of 
International Trade, Judicial Review: Is It Proving Effective in Resolving 
Trade Cases?, 131 F.R.D. 217, 305 (1990). Three judge panels are permitted 
now under 28 U.S.C. § 255(a) for cases of particular significance. 
 37. See Nippon VI, 458 F.3d at 1359. 
 38. The “foreign” interest may be a product, an exporter, a U.S. importer of 
foreign made goods, or a foreign country. 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1)(B), (k) (2012); 
see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (2012). 
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SKF USA, Inc. v. United States,39 the court discounted the im-
portance of finality and reaching the resolution of the case 
promptly. It stated that the CIT should grant voluntary re-
quests for remand by the agency except in very limited circum-
stances.40 It was almost as if the appellate court were viewing 
the case as a denial of benefits by the government. Although 
applicable to other areas of CAFC appellate jurisdiction,41 this 
view does not reflect the true nature of these particular cases. 
Changes in policy, not required by the statute, can injure the 
domestic party just as they may lower the duty obligation of 
the importer of foreign goods. If the government asks for a re-
mand for reasons of policy change rather than error, perhaps 
the court should be required to, or at least exercise its discre-
tion to, deny such a request, contrary to one reading of SKF.42 
As noted in SKF, the agency may have a right to defend its po-
sition on grounds first asserted in litigation, and it may obtain 
a remand to apply its new position if it succeeds in such litiga-
tion, but changing a result that is entirely consistent with the 
statute is another matter. Here, there is another party, besides 
the government, with a valid interest in the finality of the vic-
tory obtained. The better rule would be one that values the fi-
nality of permissible agency decisions and which leaves policy 
changes to later cases.43 
Nippon VI is almost the converse of SKF. It appears to as-
sume the ITC is a neutral referee that will come to the right 
decision if only given a(nother) chance. Neither of these cases is 
a two party case where the United States acts as a referee or a 
source of benefits. These are three party cases. The government 
                                                                                                             
 39. See SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (requiring remand at Commerce’s request to recalculate an expense to 
exporters’ or importers’ benefit). 
 40. Id. at 1029–30. 
 41. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (2012) (Merit Systems Protection Board 
appeals); 38 U.S.C. § 7292(e) (2012) (Veterans Claims appeals). 
 42. SKF, 254 F.3d at 1029–30. 
 43. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Frisco, 358 U.S. 133, 146 (1958) (finding 
that the Interstate Commerce Commission may not, without specific statuto-
ry authority, reconsider license and certificate decisions because of policy 
changes); Corus Staal BV v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 2003) (discussing finality concerns and gathering cases in conflict 
with SKF). 
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has its own policy interests at stake in trade cases.44 The gov-
ernment often makes some decisions in one side’s favor and 
other decisions for the other side. What is important is for the 
government to be treated as other parties are. If it loses, it 
should comply, and it should be able to appeal promptly. End-
less remands are not the answer, nor are midstream unfettered 
changes in policy. 
We note the case of Essar Steel Ltd. v. United States45 where 
the CAFC seemed to be moving in a direction of valuing effi-
ciency and finality by limiting the CIT’s discretion to order reo-
pening of the agency record.46 In normal practice, reopening of 
the record is left to the discretion of the agency if the court 
finds fault with specific findings of the agency.47 Essar Steel did 
not hold that an order to reopen the record is never appropri-
ate, although it mentioned only a few “exceptions” where reo-
pening may be directed, finally concluding that reopening could 
not be directed in “this case.”48 The CAFC’s espoused goal of 
finality would not be served by allowing the agency to make the 
reopening decision in virtually all instances. Sometimes it is 
the court that needs to end a case by barring reopening. Some-
times reopening is required where the agency fails to do its in-
vestigative duties, or when it disobeys the law by not accepting 
                                                                                                             
 44. The government collects duties, but the financial impact of duties is 
very limited, in contrast to the early days of the Republic. Although duties 
were imposed to protect nascent American industries, customs duties were 
also used to meet the revenue needs of the new nation. WILLIAM B. FUTRELL, 
THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN CUSTOMS JURISPRUDENCE 26–29 (1941). See United 
States v. Laurenti, 581 F.2d 37, 40 n.12 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF AMERICAN HISTORY 733 (R. Morris ed., Harper & Row bicentennial ed. 
1976)). Income taxes did not appear until the 1913 ratification of the Six-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Historical Budget Data of the 
Congressional Budget Office, August 2013, shows customs duties as about 1% 
of total revenue. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL DATA—
AUGUST 2013, available at www.cbo.gov/publication/44507. Today, control and 
oversight of trade issues is at the forefront, rather than duty collection. The 
ITC is an independent agency, but the commissioners often have different 
institutional concerns and views of trade policy. There is no reason to con-
clude that commissioners do not have the usual decision makers’ preference 
for their previous conclusions, which can become difficult to set aside as a 
case proceeds through numerous remand proceedings. 
 45. Essar Steel Ltd. v. United States, 678 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 46. Id. at 1276–77. 
 47. See id. at 1277–78. 
 48. Id. at 1278. 
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certain documents. Essar Steel may be seen as a case where the 
party seeking to have information newly considered did not 
meet its burdens, but it is also a case where the CAFC may 
have failed to recognize Commerce’s investigative responsibili-
ties and the CIT’s obligations to ensure fair agency proceed-
ings.49 
Finality is important, not just because it preserves properly 
obtained administrative and litigation results, but also because 
it aids prompt judicial review of the entire case and conclusive 
resolution of the dispute. The agencies and the courts, however, 
settle the problem of reaching finality for purposes of resolving 
the case quickly or for purposes of appellate review. It seems 
clear that any attempt to read 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(3) to forbid 
substantive reversal of agency decisions through specific re-
mand directions must be rejected as a matter of statutory con-
struction. Perhaps more importantly, the ability of the court to 
effectively order reversal is the only statutory interpretation 
that will pass constitutional muster. 
As an Article III court, the CIT is statutorily and constitu-
tionally empowered to issue decisions that are final, subject 
only to review by higher courts in the Article III hierarchy. It is 
fundamental that Article III courts cannot be required to de-
cide cases that are subject to revision by an executive branch 
agency, such as Commerce, or an independent regulatory agen-
cy, such as the ITC. Whatever its constitutional status, the ITC 
is not a part of the Judicial Branch.50 These fundamental prin-
ciples are also at play where the executive branch agency or 
independent regulatory agency is a key party to the litigation, 
as is almost always the case with CIT cases, and when control 
of the timing of the litigation is important, as is often the case 
with the court’s decisions in trade matters.51 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. at 1279 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 50. The peculiar status of independent agencies has been addressed in 
various cases. See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 
(1935) (Federal Trade Commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–96 
(1988) (gathering independent agency cases in addressing independent coun-
sel provisions of Ethics in Government Act). 
 51. For example, high duties have been alleged as the reason for failure of 
a business. See, e.g., More on GPX Bankruptcy, Alliance Acquisition, TIRE 
REVIEW (Oct. 27, 2009), 
www.tirereview.com/Article/67688/more_on_gpx_bankruptcy_alliance_acquisi
tion.aspx. See also In Re GPX Int’l Tire Corp., No. 09–20170–JNF, 2009 WL 
8032840 (Bankr. D. Mass) (July 21, 2010). And, concomitantly, low duties 
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As discussed, under CAFC holdings, unless the agency in-
vokes something close to the magic words—we are following 
the CIT’s direction, with which we disagree—an appeal to the 
CAFC is not available to the agency absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances. This may have led to a lack of immediate and full 
compliance with, at a minimum, the intent of the CIT decision 
on the part of the agency in a number of cases.52 If the agency 
is forced to comply with a judicial ruling that it views as fun-
damentally flawed, it must resist the natural tendency not to 
comply fully and reasonably. Because remand is needed to ef-
fectuate judicial review, however, the United States, a party to 
the litigation, effectively obtains control of the case’s timing 
and, if the agency is never compelled to comply with the court’s 
order because reversal is not available, control of the outcome 
as well.53 This raises serious constitutional problems. 
It is well settled that a statute should be interpreted to avoid 
constitutional issues.54 The extreme interpretation of 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1516a(c) to prohibit reversals raises serious constitutional 
questions as to an Article III court’s powers. Several questions 
are presented, including the power of an Article III court to is-
sue a final decision, whether one constant party in these cas-
es—the United States government—would be favored by giving 
it effective control of the disposition of the case, and whether 
the CIT would, in essence, issue an advisory opinion. 
In regard to Article III courts, the constitutional infirmities of 
a lack of finality and advisory opinions are often conflated and 
perhaps represent mirror images of each other. Decisions of 
                                                                                                             
may not give the domestic industry the protection it requires to survive. Duty 
deposits at the rate determined by Commerce continue to be paid to the Unit-
ed States until litigation is conclusively resolved. See Diamond Sawblade 
Mfrs. Coal. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1374, 1380–82 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (dis-
cussing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e)). Obviously, failure to resolve a case promptly 
can have disastrous business consequences. 
 52. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Qingdao Taifa 
Grp. Co. v. United States, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1346 n.2 (Ct. Int’l Trade July 
12, 2011). 
 53. While the court sets time limits for the return of remand results, agen-
cy needs often delay the results, and failures to comply fully often require 
further remands, as noted. Obviously, if outright contempt were involved, 
other remedies are available as the CIT has all the power in law and equity of 
a district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1585. 
 54. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring). 
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Article III courts must include the element of finality. The in-
firmity of a lack of finality creates an advisory opinion, which is 
beyond the powers of an Article III court. In its decision in 
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,55 the U.S. Supreme Court de-
clared: 
[T]he Framers crafted this charter of the judicial department 
with an expressed understanding that it gives the Federal 
Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide 
them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article 
III hierarchy—with an understanding, in short, that “a judg-
ment conclusively resolves the case” “because a ‘judicial pow-
er’ is one to render dispositive judgments.”56 
The CIT’s decisions are, of course, subject to CAFC review and, 
ultimately, review by the U.S. Supreme Court. But finality is 
not achieved if a decision of an Article III court is subject to re-
vision by an executive agency outside the judicial branch, such 
as the ITC or Commerce, and, concomitantly, not effectively 
subject to appeal to a higher Article III court. 
It has been a fundamental principle, as far back as Hayburn’s 
Case,57 that Article III courts cannot be required to decide cases 
subject to further action by an agency—legislative or execu-
tive—outside the judicial branch because such decisions then 
lack finality. If remands are endless because the CIT cannot 
direct a result or because the CAFC will not accept an “inter-
locutory” appeal, there is no finality. Hayburn’s Case is not an-
cient lore; rather it has been reinforced by later decisions—
United States v. Ferreira58 and Chicago & Southern Air Lines, 
Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.59—that emphasize the constitu-
tional infirmity of revision by the executive branch. 
                                                                                                             
 55. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995). 
 56. Id. at 218–19 (citation omitted). In Plaut, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that Congress could change the law and thus, the outcome of a particu-
lar case, so long as that case had not yet been decided by the highest court 
available to resolve the matter. The CAFC had reason to cite Plaut in GPX 
Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 678 F.3d 1308, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012), when 
amendments to the countervailing duty law were made to overturn a CAFC 
decision before the Supreme Court could act or the CAFC’s mandate had been 
issued. 
 57. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792). 
 58. United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 49–52 (1851). 
 59. Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113–14 
(1948). Waterman itself was cited for the same proposition in Nat’l Cable & 
1022 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:3 
Ferreira involved an 1849 statute that authorized an Article 
III federal district judge to assess specified war damage claims 
against the United States, as required by the 1819 Treaty be-
tween the United States and Spain that ceded Florida to the 
United States.60 As in Hayburn’s Case, however, the determi-
nations of the judge were subject to review by an executive 
branch officer—in this case the Secretary of the Treasury—who 
retained the ultimate authority to settle these claims.61 The 
Supreme Court ruled that “the power [given to the federal 
judge] was not judicial within the grant of the Constitution.”62 
Consequently, the district judge was acting as “a commission-
er”63 rather than as a judicial officer, and thus there was no 
judgment from which to appeal.64 In Waterman, the statute in-
volved review of actions of the Civil Aeronautics Board grant-
ing or denying air routes for foreign air carriers or denying for-
eign air routes to U.S. carriers.65 As in Ferreira, the final deci-
sions of the Article III courts would be subject unconditionally 
to the president’s approval. The Supreme Court ruled that the 
reviewing court’s decision would be an impermissible advisory 
opinion: 
This Court early and wisely determined that it would not give 
advisory opinions even when asked by the Chief Executive. It 
has also been the firm and unvarying practice of Constitu-
tional Courts to render no judgments not binding and conclu-
sive on the parties and none that are subject to later review or 
alteration by administrative action.66 
If an agency’s decisions are reviewed by the courts for law-
fulness, as the CIT does under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b), they may 
not then be subject to revision by that agency, whether the re-
vision is by means of further tasks assigned by Congress or be-
                                                                                                             
Telecomm. Assn. v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 1017 (2005) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 60. Ferreira, 54 U.S. at 45. 
 61. Id. at 45–47. 
 62. Id. at 51. 
 63. Id. at 47. 
 64. “But the acts of Congress certainly do not authorize him to convert a 
proceeding before a commissioner into [a] judicial one, nor to bring an appeal 
from his award before this court.” Id. at 49. 
 65. Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 105–06 
(1948). 
 66. Id. at 113–14. 
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cause noncompliance is permitted. The long accepted holdings 
of Plaut, Ferreira, Waterman, and Hayburn’s Case teach that 
the Constitution bars such practices. 
The question also arises whether prohibiting reversals would 
cross the constitutional line of an imposed rule of decision forc-
ing favoritism to the government, a line drawn by United 
States v. Klein67 and reinforced by United States v. Sioux Na-
tion of Indians.68 By this we do not mean deference to agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes under Chevron,69 or 
abuse of discretion review for necessarily discretionary deci-
sions, such as reasonable methodological choices.70 Such defer-
ence to resolution of issues necessarily delegated to an agency 
with particular expertise is not the same as forced resolution of 
a particular case in the government’s favor. 
The plaintiff in Klein was the administrator of the estate of a 
deceased owner of cotton which was sold by representatives of 
the U.S. government during the Civil War and the proceeds of 
which were placed in the United States Treasury.71 The plain-
tiff sued to recover those proceeds of the sale under legislation 
authorizing recovery by noncombatant Confederate owners up-
on proof of loyalty.72 The Supreme Court had earlier held that 
loyalty could be established by a presidential pardon.73 After 
the plaintiff won in the U.S. Court of Claims and during the 
pendency of the government’s appeal to the Supreme Court, 
Congress enacted legislation providing not only that a presi-
dential pardon would not be admissible as proof of loyalty, but 
that acceptance, without a written disclaimer, of a pardon that 
reported that the claimant had supported the Confederates 
would be conclusive evidence of the claimant’s disloyalty.74 The 
statute directed the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court to 
                                                                                                             
 67. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 136, 147 (1871). 
 68. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 402–04 (1980). 
 69. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1987). 
 70. See, e.g., Magnesium Corp. of America v. United States, 166 F.3d 1364, 
1372 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Commerce has discretion in choosing methods of calcu-
lating normal value for goods of nonmarket economy origin.). 
 71. Klein, 80 U.S. at 132. 
 72. Id. at 139–41. 
 73. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 542 (1870). 
 74. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 143 (1871). 
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dismiss for lack of jurisdiction any pending claims based upon 
a presidential pardon.75 
In Klein, the Supreme Court held the supervening Congres-
sional statute unconstitutional for two reasons. First, by for-
bidding the Court “to give the effect to evidence which, in its 
judgment, such evidence should have”76 and directing the Court 
“to give it an effect precisely contrary . . . Congress ha[d] inad-
vertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from 
the judicial power.”77 Second, “the rule prescribed [was] also 
liable to just exception as impairing the effect of a pardon, and 
thus infring[ed] the constitutional power of the Executive.”78 
The Court thus sought to protect the judicial and executive 
branches in the exercise of their core constitutional responsibil-
ities from the intrusion of Congress. 
Much debate has ensued about the significance and implica-
tions of the Klein decision. A key interpretation of Klein relat-
ing to this Article was made by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Sioux Nation of Indians: “[I]t prescribed a rule of deci-
sion in a case pending before the courts, and did so in a manner 
that required the courts to decide a controversy in the Govern-
ment’s favor.”79 And, while distinguishing the circumstances of 
Sioux Nation, the decision stated: “First, of obvious importance 
to the Klein holding was the fact that Congress was attempting 
to decide the controversy at issue in the Government’s own fa-
vor. Thus, Congress’ action could not be grounded upon its 
broad power to recognize and pay the Nation’s debts.”80 Sioux 
Nation was a long-running and complex dispute involving an 
1877 taking of Sioux Treaty lands based upon an 1877 statute 
and subsequent claims under a 1978 Act that provided for de 
novo review by the Court of Claims and waived a valid defense 
to the legal claim against the United States.81 The Court rein-
forced Klein but distinguished its result by determining that a 
waiver of a defense by the United States was different from 
seeking to force a decision in favor of the United States.82 As 
                                                                                                             
 75. Id. at 143–44. 
 76. Id. at 147. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 404 (1980). 
 80. Id. at 405. 
 81. Id. at 382–83, 389. 
 82. Id. at 402–07. 
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discussed, if taken literally, the inability of a court to reverse is 
a direction to affirm, and here, because it is the decision of the 
United States or an agency thereof that is reviewed, it is the 
United States that would obtain the victory. This is Klein. 
Lack of finality also creates an advisory opinion. Leaving the 
result to action of another branch of government following the 
final decision of an Article III court makes the decision an ad-
visory opinion. Relying upon Hayburn’s Case and Chicago & 
Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp.,83 Dean Erwin 
Chermerinsky concludes that the Supreme Court holds: “[A] 
case is a nonjusticiable request for an advisory opinion if there 
is not a substantial likelihood that the federal court decision 
will have some effect.”84 The lack of real world effect is the con-
sequence of permitting foot dragging and noncompliance by the 
reviewed agency and thus is a mirror image of the lack of final-
ity. In a dissenting opinion Justice Stewart concluded that the 
Article III bar to advisory opinions precludes Article III courts 
from deciding issues that do not directly affect the parties,85 a 
somewhat different statement of the same proposition. The 
continual remands caused partly by the CAFC’s refusal to ac-
cept, or discouragement of, appeals following dispositive re-
mands by the CIT, together with lack of clear recognition of the 
authority of the CIT to issue a substantive reversal, can result 
in decisions that have no effect upon the parties and thus are 
purely advisory opinions. Under current practice, the CIT’s de-
cisions cease to be advisory and have some effect only when the 
administrative agency agrees to accept the CIT’s direction, un-
der protest, often after several remands, and the case proceeds 
to a final conclusive result. This is not a rational system for re-
solving cases in our constitutional system. This Article sug-
gested various practical remedies, but the one principle that is 
clear is that Article III courts reviewing agency action for law-
fulness have the power to reverse the decision of the reviewed 
agency. It may take more steps to get to this point than is op-
timal, but this is the only answer to the question posed by Nip-
pon VI. 
                                                                                                             
 83. Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); 
Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792). 
 84. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.2 (6th ed. 2012). 
 85. Super Tire Eng’g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 127–33 (1974) (Stew-
art, J., dissenting, writing for four justices) (involving mootness). 
